Islamic Groups Vie for Power in Africa

Of course terrorism is a strategy to promote the power of group or individual of that of another. Four groups representing conflicting factions of the Islamic movement have their eye on Africa: Hezbollah, Salafism, Tablighi Jamaat, and al Qaeda. They all have the same final goal: A world-Islamic-power-structure. Some want aCaliphate with the establishment of strict Sha'ria law. All are concerned with which group will ultimately sit in the seat of power.

From: "Terrorism in Africa" by Douglas Farah at International Assement and Strategy Center

The Islamist groups are keenly aware of the advantages offered by large sections of Africa, and are seeking to exploit them. An extensive essay in the June issue of Sada al-Jihad (Echo of Jihad), an on-line magazine supporting global jihad, specifically outlines al Qaeda's growing interest in expanding into sub-Saharan Africa and the reasons the region presents opportunity for Islamist activities. Among those listed are: the general weakness of central governments and corruption, making it easier to operate in Africa than "in other countries which have effective security, intelligence and military capacities."[8]

Further complicating the strategic situation in the continent are the vast cultural and ethnic differences across geographic boundaries, and the competing (and sometimes cooperating) interests of different Islamist groups with different goals, strengths and weaknesses.

For example, the al Qaeda-linked Sunni Islamist groups present a separate threat from the radical Shi’ite groups tied to Lebanon and Hezbollah through family and business networks. This distinction is often not clearly made although it is important because the primary aims of the two groups are different.

The Shi’ite infrastructure is being bolstered by the interest and capability of Iran to expand its economic reach into Africa.[9] The primary function the Shi’ite groups is to collect funds through taxes on Lebanese-owned diamond and retail businesses, extortion and voluntary contributions that can be used to finance Hezbollah.[10] Each year an estimated $200 million is collected from the Lebanese diasporas in Africa and the Tri-Border Area of Latin America, with about half of that amount coming from Africa.[11]

The benefits for Iran are numerous, in addition to access to important strategic mineral deposits. As Iran faces growing isolation in Europe and the West, Africa offers a ready market not only for the export of ideology and religion, but of weapons and other Iranian goods. Among its primary clients are Nigeria, Senegal, Zimbabwe and South Africa.[12]

The Sunni-Salafist groups, in contrast, are seeking to build a network of like-mined jihadist groups to join the struggle to establish an Islamist caliphate, or land ruled by Muslims under strict Islamic sharia law. This Salafist theology is being spread with both official approval and funding of several Gulf states. Saudi Arabia has been investing millions of dollars in recent years in the building of Salafist mosques, often staffed by imams who repudiate the traditional, more tolerant Sufi versions of Islam historically practiced in much of Africa.

As a recent private intelligence study on Islam in Africa noted, "the generally pacific, syncretistic African Islam is being swept aside by a militant Islamism imported from the Middle East that is not only transforming local societies, but also threatening to turn an increasingly significant region into an environment hospitable to extremist violence – with reverberations that will be felt throughout the continent and beyond."[13]

The Gulf-financed expansion of Salafist movements in Africa has been accompanied by several other notable developments. One little-explored precursor of radical Islam’s growth has been the expanding influence of the Tablighi Jamaat, a network of itinerant Islamist imams and workers, usually from Pakistan where the group originated in the 1920’s, or the Middle East, who travel to local mosques to preach and go house to house in order to call Muslims to return to the true faith.

Note: The Tablighi Jamaat has also created a problematic network in Britain. Also notice which well-known terrorists had their start in this group:

There is little hard data available on the group, which provides almost no information on itself or its activities. Yet reports from intelligence groups, NGOs and academics all suggest the Tablighi movement has expanded significantly in Africa. While claiming to be non-political and peaceful, U.S. and European intelligence officials monitoring Islamist movements say the group’s recruits often move from the Tablighi movement to violent Islamist extremism. Among those first recruited by the Tablighis were John Walker Lindh, the "American Taliban;" members of the Lackawanna Six, Jose Padilla, being held as an enemy combatant for allegedly attempting to buy elements for a "dirty bomb; and Richard Reid (the shoe bomber).[14]

Note this analogy:

Farad Esack, a South African Islamic scholar who says he spent 12 years with the group in Pakistan, recounted in the New York Times a favorite Tablighi Jamaat analogy that equates individual Muslims to the electricians who work to light up a village. Each person lays wire until one day, the mayor comes to switch on the lights. "For many people in Tablighi Jamaat," he said, "the Taliban represented God switching the lights on."[15] [From: "A Muslim Missionary Group Draws Scrutiny in the U.S." New York Times, July 14, 2003.]

The Tablighi movement has been particularly active in the West African nations of Mali and Mauritania, and there are credible reports of extensive and growing networks. While not directly linked to Islamist violence in the region, the potential for recruitment through this group remains strong.[16]

There are also credible reports of Tablighi leaders being tied to violent Islamist groups in Uganda, particularly the Allied Democratic Front (ADF). The Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM) found in late 2006 that the ADF "is an alliance of at least three rebel groups, including the remnants of the secessionist Rwenzuru movement, the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda, and extremist elements from the Tabliqi Muslim community. The ADF, which decided to adopt radical Islam as its ideology, was born from a core group of puritanical Muslims from the Tabliqi sect, whose members portray themselves as ‘Muslim evangelists.’"[17]

At a minimum, the Tablighi network shares, along with other Islamist groups, the desire to recreate the Caliphate. Al Qaeda leadership, in public statements have also been explicit in stating their desire to occupy territory in Africa as one step in establishing the Caliphate, kingdom of Allah on earth, ruled under strict sharia law.

The centrality to Islamists of this concept of territorial occupation is borne out in numerous statements by al Qaeda leaders and affiliated or like-minded groups. In his Dec. 20, 2006 statement broadcast on the al Jazeera network, Bin Laden deputy Ayman Zawahiri repeatedly returned to the theme of the establishment of the physical caliphate.[18]

The key battleground of this war for Africa is currently viewed as Somalia, a country roughly the size of Texas with a population of about 9 million that sits at a strategic crossroads between Arabian Peninsula, Pakistan and Africa. For the past seven months the radical Islamic Courts Union (ICU) had controlled most of the country. The internationally-recognized government, backed by Ethiopian troops, firepower and air power, drove the Islamist forces from most of Somalia’s cities and towns between Christmas and New Years, leaving the Islamist forces on the run and in some disarray.

However, the situation is likely to remain volatile, given the history of Somalia, the long-standing interest of al Qaeda and its allies in opening another war front in what the Islamist view as a battle between true Muslims and the Jewish/Christian Crusaders, and the amount of weapons the ICU was able to bring in while in control of key airports and ports.

Osama bin Laden, in a July 2 statement, took pains to single out Somalia as an important jihadist front, and promised full support should anyone seek to attack the ICU.[19] In his statement of Dec. 22, bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman Zawahiri also directly addressed the ICU in Somalia as follows, elevating the defense of the movement to a strategic imperative:

Brothers in Islam and Jihad in Somalia: know that you are on the southern garrison of Islam, so don’t allow Islam to be attacked from your flank, and know that we are with you, and that the entire Muslim Ummah is with you. "So don’t lose heart, or fall into despair, for you must dominate if you are true in faith." (3:139) And know that you are fending off the same Crusade which is fighting your brothers in Islam in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon. So be resolute, be patient and be optimistic, for by Allah beside whom there is no other god, even if your enemies possess thousands of tons of iron and explosives, in their chests lie the hearts of mice.[20]

The recent acquisitions by the ICU were outlined starkly in an October report to the United Nations Security Council, which detailed some of the aid the Islamist forces were receiving from Saudi Arabia, Eritrea and other nations. It stated that the ICU’s military buildup included the acquisition of surface-to-air missiles, vehicles with mobile weapons platforms, and the arrival of volunteers from foreign countries who were establishing training camps and conducting sophisticated training.[21]

Given that sophisticated military arsenal, and the presence of foreign fighters now in and around Somalia, it is unlikely the war will simply ebb away, despite triumphant statements by senior Somali officials. In early January Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi said his forces, backed by Ethiopia, had neutralized the Islamists and forced them to give up or scatter into the bush. He said he does not expect any more major fighting.[22] The Islamists, in turn, responded, "If the world thinks we are dead, they should know we are alive. We will rise from the ashes."[23]

Outside analysts said there was reason for pessimism, noting that the situation in Somalia has been badly misread in the past, particularly regarding the roles of the clan, family and sub-clan structures that govern Somali life. In 1993 the U.S. military and intelligence community failed to understand the situation the troops on the ground were facing, leading to the infamous "Black Hawk Down" incident, wherein the bodies of dead U.S. Rangers were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. As one analyst noted: "Because of this disdain for the Somali tribal group as a military organization, the United States underestimated Somali capacity to adapt to and fight effectively in the urban environment of Mogadishu. Disaster followed."[24] This has been a pattern not only in Somalia, but across much of Africa.

U.S. intelligence officials monitoring the situation in the Horn of Africa said the U.S. intelligence community was largely unprepared for the initial triumph of the ICU in Somalia, believing that U.S.-backed groups would be able to provide an effective counter to the Islamists. However, the brutality and impunity with which the U.S.-backed forces operated made the ICU, with its promises of law and order seem more appealing. In the event. The ICU’s promises, which they implemented quickly and effectively, were strikingly similar to the Taliban and resulted in widespread disaffection in areas under their control.

Intelligence community sources say the Pentagon has more intelligence resources in Africa than any other member of the community because it has personnel in most countries and joint training exercises that open doors in many places which other members of the community cannot open. Yet much of the information developed on the Somali situation – and the rest of Africa -- by the U.S. military has received little attention from the various commands which different intelligence gatherers and analysts report to, according to military sources. As a result, even with good collection, policy decisions are long delayed and there is little attention focused from either military or civilian principals on Africa issues.

Military officials said that a single command that was able to look at all the information from the different areas of interest, from Somalia to Liberia to South Africa, would be in a better position to avoid another surprise such as the ICU takeover of Somalia. As both the Salafist jihadists and Iranian-backed Shi’ite groups such as Hezbollah target Africa for a variety of reasons—all of them hostile to U.S interests and the long-term interests the African nations they target—understanding the enemy will become increasingly vital.

Al Qaeda has publicly expressed its intention to expand in Africa, and Hezbollah has already developed a sophisticated and deeply-embedded financial infrastructure in many countries. The Tablighi network and other forces of radicalization are already scattered across the continent and have the financial and human resources to continue their efforts in conditions that favor the reception of their message. Those are among the formidable challenges that we know of. There are likely many more that we do not yet have any inkling of. The question is whether we are prepared to fight in Africa’s multi-layered conflict, the outcome of which can seriously affect us, despite its seeming remoteness.

Read it all. The original is followed by linked footnotes.